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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
JUDSON A. SAMUELS*
The cases which have appeared before the Florida Supreme Court
during the period under consideration clearly demonstrate the rapid growth
and progress taking place throughout the state of Florida.
The number and purposes of validation proceedings appearing for
judicial scrutiny reflect the necessity for extending present municipal serv-
ices in order to meet the needs of a growing population, as well as to pro-
vide new services for a well-developed and crystallized permanent popula-
tion. The injustices resulting from the application of certain zoning
ordinances have come to light in many circumstances after the lands
encompassed within the use districts, provided for by the zoning ordinance,
have been put to the use contemplated under the ordinance. Cases dealing
with zoning demonstrated the great lack of proper city planning in many
municipalities throughout Florida and an occasional effort to justify arbi-
trary and unreasonable zoning by economic considerations.'
The tort liability of a municipality reveals continued acceptance of
the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions as well as
the vagueness of the distinction, In this regard, great injustices are com-
mitted, particularly when an innocent third party is denied recovery against
a municipality for damages resulting from the brutality of its law enforce-
ment officers.2
ZONING
Since a zoning ordinance constitutes a regulation of the property rights
of a landowner, by limiting the use of his lands, it is justified as a valid
exercise of the police power.3 In this regard, it is universally agreed that
a zoning ordinance must bear a substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare. 4 Thus, it has been held that a zoning
ordinance permitting the establishment of a jewelry shop, beauty parlor
and other similar shops, and prohibiting the establishment of a millinery
shop, was unconstitutional in that the limitations imposed upon the use
of property did not bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare.5  The mere fact that the limitations were
imposed for economic considerations in an effort to afford greater stability
to similar shops already in existence was insufficient justification.
As in the case of other legislative enactments, a zoning ordinance is
presumptively valid, and the person assailing its validity has the burden of
*Professor, University of Miami School of Law; City Attorney, City of Hollywood.
1. Miami Beach v. 8701 Collins Ave., 77 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1955).
2. Wilford v. Jacksonville Beach, 79 So.2d 516 (Fla. 1955).
3. Miami v. Romer, 73 So.2d 285 (Fla. 1954).
4. 58 Am. JuR. Zoning § 26, p. 956.
5. See note 1 supra.
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alleging and proving that the enactment is discriminatory, unreasonable,
confiscatory or otherwise unconstitutional.6 Allegations attacking the validity
of the ordinance which are mere conclusions of the pleader are insufficient.
Thus, it has been declared by the Florida Supreme Court:
One who assails such legislation must carry the burden of both
alleging and proving that the municipal enactment is invalid . . .
the burden of one who attacks such an ordinance has been called
an extraordinary one. King v. Guerra, Tex. Civ. App., 1927, 1
S.W.2d 373. Allegations and such an attack which are conclusions
of the pleader are not enough. To say that a zoning code is bad
simply because it permits one type of business in a given district
and prohibits another does not meet the burden of alleging ultimate
facts.7
It has been declared oii numerous occasions that the court will not
undertake to substitute its judgment for that of the legislative body in
determining the validity of zoning ordinances. Consequently, xhen an
ordinance is fairly debatable its constitutional validity will be sustained.8
The mere fact that property would be of greater value when put to a use
not permitted under an ordinance does not justify the conclusion that the
ordinance is unreasonable and confiscatory. Thus, the Supreme Court has
declared:
An ordinance may be said to be fairly debatable when for any
reason it is open to debate or controversy on grounds that make
sense or point to a logical deduction that in no way involved its
constitutional validity. If such a deduction supports the city's
contention that to remove the present zoning restrictions would
destroy the entire zoning scheme and bring about the evils con-
tended by the city, then the court should not substitute its judg-
ment for that of the City Council. There is no showing here that,
even as now zoned, the lands are not of great value. In fact, the
only deduction front the record is that they are very valuable.9
Since one of the prime requisites of any legislative enactment is
certainty, when a zoning ordinance is uncertain in its terms or undertakes
to delegate legislative powers to an administrative officer, it will be de-
nounced either upon the ground of uncertainty or upon the ground of
unlawful delegation of legislative powers. In this respect, the case of
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Anderson'0 is interesting and worthy of note.
The Phillips Petroleum Company purchased land for the purpose of
constructing a gasoline station. The property under consideration was
situated in a business "A" zone which expressly permitted filling stations,
but which provided:
6. Miami Beach v. Silver, 67 So.2d 646 (Fla. 1953).
7. Id. at 647.
8. Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So.2d 148 (Fla. 1953).
9. Id. at 152.
10. 74 So.2d 544 (Fla. 1954).
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All of the above listed described and permitted uses in a business
"A" district shall be permitted in such business "A" districts, pro-
vided that no operation shall be carried on which is injurious to
the operating personnel of the business or to other properties,
or to the occupants thereof by reason of the objectionable emission
of cinders, dust, dirt, fumes, gas, odor, noise, refuse matter, smoke,
vapor, vibration, or similar substances or conditions.11
On the basis of the above quoted provision, the building inspector, while
acting consistently with the wishes of the city commission, denied the
issuance of a building permit. In denouncing the ordinance as unconstitu-
tional, the Supreme Court did so upon the basis that the ordinance failed
to provide an adequate standard in order to govern the power of an
administrative official and consequently constituted an unquestionable dele-
gation of legislative power. In the light of the court's decision, it is difficult
to ascertain the formulation of an ordinance which could effectively preclude
the operation of a business on account of objectionable emission of noises
or odors. However, in spite of this shortcoming and as the Supreme Court
suggested, if operation of the business, although pursuant to the ordinance,
becomes objectionable, some remedy may be available by resort to the
courts on the basis of nuisance.
DEDICATION
In order to constitute a dedication of property the owner must offer
the use of the property to the public, and there must be an acceptance
on the part of the public. The offer can be either expressed or implied,
oral or written, so long as it adequately shows an intent on the part of
the owner to offer the property for public use.12 In these respects, a dedica-
tion is peculiar in that it operates as a conveyance of real property or an
interest therein without the necessity of a writing-an exception to the
Statute of Frauds.
Dedications are generally classified as either statutory or common law.
A statutory dedication is most frequently created by the filing and recording
of a plat designating the areas for public use. A common law dedication
generally rests upon an estoppel in pais and is frequently found existent,
although a statutory dedication may be insufficient.1 s The most serious prob-
lems relative to dedication are concerned with the adequacy of an offer
and acceptance. Thus, it has been held that where a plat of a subdivision
is filed of record, pursuant to law, and there is an area designated between
a public street and a waterway, the recordation of the plat alone is
insufficient to establish a dedication of that portion of the property. 14
11. Id. at 545.
12. Roe v. Hendrick, 146 Fla., 119, 200 So. 394 (1941); Miami Beach v. Miami
Beach Improvement Co., 153 Fla. 107, 14 So.Zd 172 (1943).
13. 11 MCQUILLIN ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 33.03, pp. 586-87 (3d ed.
1950).
14. Earle v. McCarthy, 70 So.2d 314 (Fla. 1954).
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This result becomes more evident where the area between the public
street and the waterway is divided into lots.
Declarations on the part of the city officials, although made during
different city administrations, that certain property is to be used for the
construction of a public park do not serve to establish a dedication where
no clear and unequivocal offer has been made by the owner of the property.
Thus, it has been held, with reference to land lying between a public drive
and a river, that there is no dedication merely by filing a plat of the sub-
division and by declaration of city officials that the land would be used
for the construction of a riverfront park, although an ordinance was also
adopted prohibiting the erection of buildings upon the property. 3  With
reference to the ordinance, it was held that it constituted a violation of
the due process clause of the constitution since the city had no interest
in the land whatsoever.
Once a dedication has been completed by offer and acceptance, it
is agreed that the property could subsequently be abandoned by the public.
However, in order to constitute an abandonment, the intent must be
clearly manifested. The mere fact that the dedicated property is not placed
to use is insufficient to create an abandonment, particularly when there is
no necessity for effectuating any improvements upon the property.'6
REGULATION OF BUSINESS
No generalizations can be made with reference to the validity and
reasonableness of an ordinance regulating the time during which a business
can be operated. In each instance the validity is dependent upon the nature
of the business involved as well as the nature of the area in which the
regulation is sought to be imposed. The justification for an ordinance regu-
lating the time during which businesses can be conducted is derived from
the police power, consequently, the regulation must bear a substantial
relationship to the public health, morals, welfare, or safety.' 7
It has been consistently held that the sale of alcoholic beverages is a
proper subject of regulation; however, the regulation must be reasonable
and non-discriminatory. Thus, when both a municipality as well as the
state undertake to regulate the hours for the sale of alcoholic beverages,
both regulations will be given full force and effect, except in the case of
inconsistencies, in which event the state regulation will prevail. This
principle found application in the case of Boven v. St. Petersburg.'8 An
action for a declaratory judgment was brought for the purpose of deter-
mining the validity of an ordinance, enacted by the city, regulating the
opening hours for business establishments dealing in the sale of alcoholic
15. Beck v. Littlefield, 68 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1953).
16. Indian Rocks Beach South Shore v. Ewell, 59 So.2d 647 (Fla. 1932).
17. 58 A ,. lfUt. Zoning § 68, p. 984-985.
18. 73 So.2d 232 Fia. 1954).
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beverages. The ordinance provided that such business establishments were
authorized to open at 6:00 A.M. After adoption of the ordinance, the
legislature enacted a statute"' which providcd that establishments selling
alcoholic beverages were permitted to open at 8:00 AM.; however, a duly
organized municipal government could further restrict or limit the sale of
alcoholic beverages in which event the more stringent regulation would
be applicable. In declaring the ordinance invalid, the Supreme Court
did so upon the ground of inconsistency declaring:
It is only in case of conflict between the public general law and an
ordinance that the general law prevails over the ordinance.20
The same result is applicable in the event a municipal ordinance is
in conflict with federal regulations. This was aptly demonstrated in the
case of Tatum v. Hallandale.2 1 The appellant was engaged in the business
of flying airplanes towing advertising banners over the Gulfstream Race
Track, lying within the city. The appellant was arrested for flying an
airplane towing an advertising banner without a permit, as required by a
city ordinance. In attempting to have the ordinance declared invalid, the
appellant contended:
1. That the regulations of the federal aeronautics board were
in conflict with the ordinance and, therefore, were supreme;
2. That the flying of an airplane towing an advertising banner
was not a business subject to regulation by a municipality;
3. That the ordinance was inconsistent with a statute passed
by the Florida Legislature. 22
At that time the federal aeronautics board imposed various require-
ineits which included a special tow attachment and release mechanism,
a certificate of waiver, and a federal license to fly the airplane. In addition,
the flight was required to be in compliance with its rules and regulations.
The statute23 passed by the Florida Legislature provided that it shall be
unlawful for any municipality to collect any license or registration fee on
any aircraft or glider in the state. The ordinance under which the appellant
was arrested required a permit or licensing of the operator of an airplane
but did not impose any tax or license upon the aircraft as such. In
sustaining the ordinance, the Supreme Court concluded that no inconsistency
existed between the ordinance and the state statute or federal regulations
and that the activities of the appellant constituted a proper subject for
municipal regulation under its police power. In arriving at its conclusion,
the Supreme Court declared:
We hold that the owner or operator of an aircraft operating over
a municipality of this state for the purpose of exhibiting advertising
19. Laws of Fla. c. 19419 (1953).
20. 73 So.2d 232, 234 (Fla. 1954).
21. 71 So.2d 495 (Fla. 1954).
22. FLA. S4 'r. § 330.17 (1953).
23. Ibid.
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by signs, sound or otherwise, to the populace of said municipality,
is, to the extent of such operation, doing business within said city
and is subject to reasonable regulation by such municipality so
long as said regulation does not conflict with either a state or
federal regulation concerning the operation of aircraft, and relates
to matters which are properly subject to the police power of said
municipality. 24
It is generally agreed that there is no vested or inherent right to
operate taxicabs upon the public streets. The business of conducting taxi-
cabs for hire upon public streets is a privilege which can be withheld,
restricted, or, when once issued, withdrawn in the discretion of the
municipality. Thus, it has been declared:
The right to use the streets and highways of a municipality for the
conduct of a strictly private business is not inherent; it can be
acquired by permission or license from the city, thus power to with-
hold or grant it in the manner and to the extent it may see fit is
an essential prerogative of municipal government. 2
Since a municipality has the right to grant or deny the privilege of operating
a taxicab business upon its streets, it necessarily has the implied power to
impose terms and conditions upon the issuance of permits. Thus, it is
agreed that conditions, including good character and fitness of licensees,
can be imposed upon the granting and withholding of licenses.20  These
principles were applied in the interesting case of Pratt v. Hollywood.2 7 The
appellant made application to the city for the transfer of permits for the
operation of the taxicab business upon its streets. The police department
investigated the circumstances surrounding the transfer and determined
that a person guilty of various crimes would be associated with the
appellant in the conduct of the business. The city then notified the
appellant that any association of the person with the taxi business would
be contrary to the welfare of the city and would prcclude the issuance of
the permits. The appellant thereafter assured the city in writing that the
person would be in no way associated with the conduct of the business.
Upon receipt of these assurances the city issued the transfer permits and
later threatened to revoke them for the appellant's failure to abide by
the assurances given to the city. In concluding that the city had the right
to suspend the licenses for the violation of the assurances given by the
appellant the Supreme Court held that the city had the authority to suspend
the licenses for any good cause affecting the public health, safety, morals
and welfare of those resorting to the taxicab business for service.
TORTS
At the common law it was not essential for a person injured as a
result of the tortious conduct of a municipality to advise the municipal
24. 71 So.2d 495, 497 (Fla. 1954).
25. Jarrell v. Orlando Transit Co., 123 Fla. 776, 167 So. 664 (1936).
26. McWhorter v. Settle, 202 Ga, 334, 43 S.E.2d 247 (1947).
27. 78 So.2d 697 (Fla. 1955).
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authority of his injury or to seek compensation prior to the institution
of an action. 2 8  This common law holding has been modified by charter
provisions which ordinarily require a notice of claim within a specified
time from the date of injury or the date of the accrual of the cause of
action. Such limitations have uniformly been sustained as constitutional
and do not constitute an unwarranted discrimination between municipal
and private corporations. The provision is generally justified upon a strong
public policy which attempts to dispense with needless litigation. Thc
notice, as a condition precedent to suit, affords municipal authorities the
opportunity to investigate a tort claim against the city and to settle the
claim without litigation if the circumstances justify. This requirement of
notice, as a condition precedent to the institution of a lawsuit against the
city, has no application in causes of action arising from contract. Thus,
the Supreme Court said:
A passenger who was allegedly injured because of the negligent
operation of the city's bus, had right to ground her action for
injury against city on breach of an implied contract to deliver her
safely, and therefore requirement of notice to city before bringing
action was immaterial.2
9
And again in Holbrook v. Sarasota, the court declared:
Where patient in city hospital was injured by being permitted
to fall from bed, patient could properly bring action for breach
of contract, express or implied, to furnish nursing care and
attention, and was not required to bring action sounding in tort,
and hence provision in city charter that no suit shall be maintained
against city arising out of any tortious action or action sounding
in tort unless written notice of such damage be given within 30 days
after injury, was not applicable to bar the action for failure to
give such notice.39
Although notice as a condition precedent is not necessary in actions
arising from contract, the general statute of limitations is applicable.
In this respect, the general rule is to the effect that where an injury,
although slight, is sustained by virtue of wrongful conduct on the part
of another, the statute of limitations attaches at once. The fact that
actual or substantial damages do not occur until after the injury has been
sustained does not serve to postpone the running of the statute. However,
a limitation upon the application of the statute of limitations was imposed
by the Florida Supreme Court in Miami v. Brooks.3' The plaintiff, while
a patient at a hospital received injuries to her heel by x-ray therapy treat-
ment. The injuries were sustained in April of 1944; however, the first
manifestation appeared in the middle of May of 1949. In holding that her
claim was not barred by the statute of limitations, the Florida Supreme
28. 38 Af. JUR. Municipal Corporations § 673, p. 381.
29. Doyle v. Coral Gables, 159 Fla. 802, 33 So.2d 41 (Fh. 1947).
30. 58 So.2d 862 (Fla. 1952).
31. 70 So.2d 306 (Fla. 1954).
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Court held to the effect that the statute of limitations attaches only whcn
there has been notice of an invasion of a legal right of the plaintiff. In
the instant case, so the court reasoned, at the time the x-ray treatment
was administered, there was nothing to indicate any injury or to place
the plaintiff on notice of any invasion of her legal right. In arriving at
its conclusion, the Supreme Court emphasized the distinction existing
between notice of the negligent action and notice of its consequences.
If a plaintiff received no notice of the negligent action, the statute of
limitations does not commence running. However, if the plaintiff has
notice of the cause of action, the statute commences running although there
is no indication relative to its consequences.
In practical effect, it is difficult to ascertain the justification for the
distinction. This is particularly true since a person sustaining an injury
due to the ordinary negligence of another has no cause of action unless
damages are alleged and proved. It is, therefore, evident that under certain
circumstances, although a party plaintiff is cognizant of an offensive contact
resulting from the negligence of another, actual damages may not be sus-
tained until after the statute of limitations has expired. Since this result
is inescapable it is difficult to see how justice demands or requires any
distinction between notice of the negligent act and notice of its conse-
quences.
In determining the tort liability of a city for improper maintenance of
its streets the use intended for the particular parts of the street where the
cause of action arose is a factor which will be considered. Thus, where a
pedestrian was injured as the result of a fall while crossing an unlighted street
at night, at a point not intended for use by pedestrian traffic, the fact that
the sandy shoulder was three or four inches lower than the pavement does
not constitute a basis for imposing liability upon the city.3 2 In arriving at
its conclusions the Supreme Court declared:
While it is true that a different responsibility is placed upon a
municipality to keep streets, that is, the space between the property
lines, reasonably safe for use by the public, we think that in deter-
mining the propriety of the discharge of that duty the court must
consider the use intended for particular parts of those streets,
thus, a municipality should only be required to keep a specified
portion of the street in a condition reasonably safe for the kind of
traffic intended for itY33
The distinction between corporate and governmental capacity for pur-
poses of determining tort liability of a municipality continues to exist in a
cloud of uncertainty. The Supreme Court has previously held that a mu-
nicipal corporation is not liable for tortious acts of its police officers com-
mitted as an incident to the exercise of purely governmental functions.3 4
32. Ft. Lauderdale v. Duchine, 70 So.2d 897 (Fla. 1954).
33. Id. at 898.
34. Miami v. Bethel, 65 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1953).
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Thus, where a policeman beat an individual whom he accused of engaging
in a dice game, it was held his act was incidental to a governmental func-
tion, thereby exonerating the city from any responsibility.35 In this respect,
the Supreme Court has been consistent. From all indications, a city cannot
be held accountable for the tortious acts of its police officers. In order to
afford innocent victims of arbitrary and unjustified attacks by police officers,
public policy will, in all probability, and in the not too distant future,
manifest itself in the form of a statute affording remedies under such
circumstances.
VALIDATION
As aii expedient for the validation of municipal obligations, the Florida
Statutes 6 make provision for a procedure that may be instituted in the
form of a petition naming the State of Florida and taxpayers affected as
parties defendant. Although this procedure is made available it is not
deemed to be exclusive since declaratory relief has been held to be avail-
able for the same purpose. 7 However, there are several distinctions existing
between the statutory validation procedure and declaratory relief, which ren-
ders the former more advantageous and desirable. For example, no right
is conferred upon a taxpayer or citizen to compel the governing authority
of a municipality to invoke the validation procedure provided for by
statute, nor can the procedure be placed in motion by the citizen or tax-
payer himself. Further, a declaratory decree once issued is not binding
upon, nor does it affect, the rights of parties or persons not made de-
fendants to the proceedings. In addition, under the declaratory judgment
statute the right of review is the same as in other types of actions and an
appeal is available only from an adverse decree against the appellant.
However, under the statutory validation procedure, a review is available by
any party to the cause, whether petitioner, defendant, or intervenor, or
any other person dissatisfied with the final decree.
These distinctions were clearly declared and considered in North Shore
Bank v. Surfside.3 8 The town adopted an ordinance authorizing the is-
suance of $70,000 of public improvement certificates for the purpose of
raising funds to acquire certain lands to be used as a supplement to and an
addition to its bathing facilities. Thereafter, the town instituted an action
for a decree declaring that the certificates were legal obligations of the
town and did not require the approval of the qualified electors as a condi-
tion precedent to their issuance. By way of defense in the action, it was
contended that declaratory relief was not the proper remedy for validation,
and that the only remedy available was that conferred by statute relative
35. Ibid.
36. FLA. STAT. § 75.02 (1949).
37. North Shore Bank v. Surfside, 72 So.2d 659 (Fla. 1954).
38. Ibid.
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to validation procedure. The Supreme Court denounced this contention
as being without justification, and proceeded to conclude that by virtue
of the distinctions between declaratory relief and statutory validation, the
latter was most desirable and should be resorted to.
DELEGATION OF POWER
It is a well-established principle that a legislative body cannot delegate
authority to administrative tribunals without imposing sufficient standards
governing the administrative officers' conduct. 39 It is equally well-settled
that a municipality possesses only such authority as has been conferred
upon it by the legislature. Since the Florida Constitution40 confers upon
the legislature the power to establish and abolish municipalities, it is in
derrogation of the Constitution for the legislature to attempt to delegate
unlimited authority to a municipality. Thus, in Orlando v. Hill;' the Su-
preme Court denounced an attempt by the legislature to confer upon the
city the power to adopt a new charter without subsequent legislative approval.
SPEcLtu AssEssmEIrs
A special assessment is a charge imposed for the purpose of paying the
cost of a local improvement in a municipality and levied only on those
lands which derive special benefit from the improvement. Once a special
assessment has been imposed it constitutes a lien upon the property bene-
fited and is enforceable as in the ease of municipal taxes or as in the case
of mortgage foreclosures.
In Miami v. Board of Public Instruction,42 the Supreme Court con-
sidered the problem of whether a special assessment imposed by the city
was collectable from the Board of Public Instruction when the schools
were benefited by the improvement. The city had constructed sidewalks
and had installed sewer mains along the street upon which the schools were
located. The city made demand upon the Board of Public Instruction for
the payment of special assessments which had accrued prior to 1953. In its
action, the city relied upon a statute43 passed by the Florida Legislature in
1953 which expressly authorized the Board of Public Instruction to dis-
charge lawfully imposed encumbrances upon school properties which
had been imposed for special or local assessments. The Board of Public
Instruction defended upon the theory that since the word authorized was
used in the statute, payment of the encumbrances was discretionary with
the Board and could not be compelled by the city. In denouncing the
39. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Anderson, 74 So.2d 544 (1954).
40. FLA. CONST. ART. 8, § 8 (1885):
The legislature shall have power to establish, and to abolish municipalities,
to provide for their government, to prescribe their jurisdiction and powers,
and to alter or amend the same at any time. When any municipality shall
be abolished, provision shall be made for the protection of its creditors.
41. 67 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1953)
42. 72 So.2d 901 (Fla. 1954).
43. FLA. STATr. § 235.34 (1953).
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conleution advanced, the Suprcmc Court held that the statute was manda-
tory in nature, since to construe it as discretionary would violate the well
established principle that unbridled discretion can not be delegated to an
administrative tribunal by the legislature. However, in its holding, the
Supreme Court denied recovery solely upon the ground that a statute is
not to be given a retrospective effect unless intended by the legislature.
CONCLUSION
It is reasonable to assume that the present rate of growth and progress
in the State of Florida will continue, and consequently, the Supreme Court
will be confronted with a large number of validation proceedings, and cases
involving the constitutionality of zoning ordinances. It is also reasonable to
assume that continued concentration of population will bring many new
municipal problems before the Supreme Court for determination. Many
of these new problems will require legislation; however, in the interim period,
until legislation is enacted, cases of first impression will appear. The cases
involving tort liability of a municipality clearly reveal the necessity for
legislation as a substitute for the distinction between governmental and
proprietary functions now used by the Supreme Court.
